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NOTE
A SEA OF CONFUSION: THE SHIPOWNER'S
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY ACT AS AN INDEPENDENT
BASIS FOR ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
Amie L. Medley*
The Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 allowed the
owner of a vessel to limit his liability in the case of an accident to
the value of the vessel and its cargo if he could show he had no
knowledge of or participation in the negligent act that resulted in
the loss. In 1911, the Supreme Court decided Richardson v. Har-
mon, a case which was interpreted for several decades to hold that
the Limitation Act formed an independent basis for admiralty juris-
diction. In a 1990 case, the Supreme Court stated in a footnote that
it would not reach the question of whether the Limitation Act was
an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction-which several
Courts of Appeal took to mean that the Act's continued vitality as a
jurisdictional basis was an open question. Since that time, many
Courts of Appeal have held that the Limitation Act is not, for a va-
riety of reasons, an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction.
This Note argues that the Limitation Act continues to form an inde-
pendent basis for admiralty jurisdiction. It examines the history of
admiralty jurisdiction and the Limitation Act and explains why the
Limitation Act should form an independent basis for admiralty ju-
risdiction even for cases in which the facts of the underlying tort
claim might not otherwise come within the boundaries of admiralty.
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INTRODUCTION
The Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act,' a peculiar and often-
criticized creature of admiralty law, allows the owner of a vessel to limit his
liability to the value of the vessel following an accident, provided he had no
knowledge of the negligence that caused the accident For example, a
common scenario when the Limitation Act was passed involved vessel own-
ers who bought a ship and entrusted it to a captain and crew who were
solely responsible for its maintenance and operation. If some event such as a
fire or collision took place, the owner could demonstrate a lack of "privity
or knowledge" and limit his liability. When the Act was passed in 1851, the
goal was to ensure that businessmen would not be deterred from investing in
shipping and shipbuilding because of the risk of facing enormous liability
due to the actions of a crew.' Over time, the Act has been amended and in-
terpreted to apply to all sorts of vessels, ranging from ocean liners to small
pleasure boats. It has also become commonplace to argue that the Limitation
Act should be abolished: critics have, for example, focused on such issues as
the Act's ability to unfairly limit damages in certain cases and the potential
4for defense attorneys to employ the Act as a strategic weapon.
1. 46 U.S.C.S. § 30505 (LexisNexis 2007).
2. In order to invoke the Limitation Act, a vessel owner must prove the loss occurred "with-
out [his] privity or knowledge"-that he did not participate in or have any knowledge of the
negligence leading to the accident. 3 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, LIMITATION OF LIABILITY § 41 (7th
ed., rev. 2008).
3. E.g., Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 116 (1872) (discussing ancient
limitation laws and noting Grotius' statement that "men would be deterred from investing in ships if
they thereby incurred the apprehension of being rendered liable to an indefinite amount by the acts
of the master....").
4. E.g., GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 846 (2d ed.
1975) ("The only safe thing to do with such a statute is to repeal it... "); Mark A. White, Com-
ment, The 1851 Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act: Should the Courts Deliver the Final Blow?,
24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 821 (2004). While certain policy considerations counsel against an expansive
reading of the Limitation Act, chipping away at it piece by piece is an ineffective approach. Elimi-
nating the Act's power to support admiralty jurisdiction would trade one set of problems for another.
See infra Section II.B.
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Based on the natures or localities of underlying claims, many cases in
which a vessel owner may wish to invoke the Limitation Act are already
obviously within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. For exam-
ple, tort claims are swept into admiralty jurisdiction if the event or events
giving rise to the claims (1) occurred on navigable waters and (2) had some
connection or nexus with traditional maritime activity.5 In some cases, how-
ever, a defendant vessel owner wishes to use the Limitation Act to limit his
liability, even though the statute itself (rather than locality or nature) is the
6
only basis for admiralty jurisdiction. In such cases, courts must determine
whether the Limitation of Liability Act creates an independent basis for ad-
miralty jurisdiction. Although the practice of seven decades was to answer
this question in the affirmative, in recent years several circuit courts have
• 7
sought to change this long-standing rule.
This Note argues that the Limitation of Liability Act continues to pro-
vide an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction. Part I of this Note
discusses the difficulty of identifying the bounds of admiralty jurisdiction or
the scope of the Limitation Act. It then analyzes Richardson v. Harmon,8 the
case in which the Supreme Court in 1911 extended admiralty jurisdiction
based on the Limitation Act even though the underlying claim could not
otherwise have been brought in admiralty. Finally, Part I introduces the con-
troversy, rekindled by a Supreme Court footnote in 1990, over whether the
Limitation Act serves (or should continue to serve) as an independent basis
for jurisdiction. Part II first examines the reasoning of several Courts of Ap-
peal that have held the Limitation Act not to be an independent ground for
admiralty jurisdiction, and argues that these courts have erred in departing
from the rule in Richardson. It then explains why the Limitation Act should
continue to be read consistently with Richardson as an independent basis for
admiralty jurisdiction.
5. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972). For purposes
of admiralty jurisdiction, a navigable waterway is a "stream or body of water, susceptible of being
made, in its natural condition, a highway for commerce, even though that trade be nothing more
than the floating of lumber in rafts or logs." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 560 (1871).
The "natural condition" of a water body does not refer to whether the water would be navigable in
its original, natural state; rather, it means that a waterway is not to be considered navigable if flood-
ing occasionally causes it to support a vessel of some kind. United States v. Appalachian Elec.
Power Co., 311 U.S. 377,407 (1940).
6. For example, if two boats collide on a lake considered nonnavigable for purposes of
admiralty jurisdiction over torts, an owner may still wish to invoke the Limitation Act. E.g., Three
Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. Ltd. v. Morts, 921 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1990).
7. E.g., Seven Resorts, Inc. v. Cantlen, 57 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 1995); Three Buoys, 921 F.2d
775; Lewis Charters v. Huckins Yacht Corp., 871 F.2d 1046 (1 1th Cir. 1989); In re Sisson, 867 F.2d
341 (7th Cir. 1989).
8. 222 U.S. 96 (1911).
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I. THE SCOPE OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND THE LIMITATION ACT
AS AN INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
For several decades, it seemed there was little doubt that the Limitation
Act constituted an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction. Scholars
stated this rule in treatises,9 Supreme Court cases cited it,'0 and the Second
Circuit in particular applied it in cases that would not have traditionally been
classified as maritime claims on the basis of the case facts." It was not until
the early 1990s that several Federal Courts of Appeal, including the Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, began to hold otherwise, finding in-
stead that in the absence of facts giving rise to maritime jurisdiction vessel
owners simply could not get their cases into federal court through admiralty
jurisdiction. 2 Section L.A begins with the Constitution's grant of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, and discusses the history and the current state of
that jurisdiction. Section I.B examines the text of the Limitation of Liability
Act of 1851, the statute that Congress used to expand admiralty jurisdiction
significantly. Section I.C introduces Richardson v. Harmon, the case in
which the Supreme Court first extended admiralty jurisdiction based solely
on a petition to limit liability, and explains how Richardson set the stage for
the circuit split today. Section I.D describes the recent controversy, sparked
by a footnote in a Supreme Court opinion, over the Act's status as a jurisdic-
tional basis.
A. The Puzzle of Defining Admiralty Jurisdiction
The contours of admiralty jurisdiction have been puzzling and imprecise
from the time that Article III was written in the late eighteenth century.13
Article III provides constitutional authorization for Congress to grant the
federal courts jurisdiction over "all cases of admiralty and maritime Juris-
diction."'' 4 Unfortunately, this language offers little or no hint as to what sort
of matters actually constitute "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." The
inclusion of the word "maritime" was perhaps meant to imply that the
boundaries of "admiralty and maritime" jurisdiction in the United States
9. E.g., I BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, JURISDICTION AND PRINCIPLES § 225 (7th ed., rev.
2008) ("Proceedings by vessel owners to limit their liability as permitted by the Acts of Congress
are within the admiralty jurisdiction even if the claims limited against might not be sued upon in
admiralty."); GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 4, at 846.
10. E.g., Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 386 (1941) ("When the jurisdiction of the court in
admiralty has attached through a petition for limitation, the jurisdiction to determine claims is not
lost merely because the shipowner fails to establish his right to limitation.").
11. See, e.g., The No. 6, 241 F. 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1917) (noting that the damage to a gas line
buried under the Harlem River was "not wrought on or in the water" and as such was a nonmaritime
tort).
12. See Seven Resorts, 57 F.3d 771; Three Buoys, 921 F.2d 775; Lewis Charters, 871 F.2d
1046; In re Sisson, 867 F.2d 341.
13. The Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361, 365 (1904) ("The precise scope of admiralty jurisdiction
is not a matter of obvious principle or of very accurate history.").
14. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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would be more expansive than was the somewhat limited jurisdiction of
English admiralty courts.' Admiralty jurisdiction in the United States, for
example, would cover "all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries,' ', 6 while in
England, many such cases were decided by the common law courts instead
of the admiralty courts.' 7 The United States has never had admiralty courts
separate from other federal courts; instead, the District Courts have the
power to hear cases based on admiralty jurisdiction. Until 1966, the District
Courts maintained separate dockets for admiralty cases, but they currently
appear on the same docket. Even so, some mechanisms specific to admiralty
jurisdiction still exist-the general maritime law can be applied where ap-
propriate, and the procedures found in the Supplemental Maritime Rules
apply. For example, there is no right to jury trial in admiralty cases.
Shortly after ratification of the Constitution, Congress acted upon its Ar-
ticle III power and in the First Judiciary Act of 1789 granted the District
Courts "exclusive original cognizance of all civil cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction." 8 The language of the Act resembled that of Article
III, but further detailed the jurisdictional grant, seeking to clarify confusion
resulting from Article III's general nature. A major priority for Congress in
enacting the First Judiciary Act, for example, was to ensure that prize cases
involving seizures made at sea or in waters navigable from the sea would be
adjudicated in federal courts instead of state courts, which had heard such
cases following the Revolutionary War. 9 Two important provisions that
initially appeared in the First Judiciary Act and now appear in § 1333
granted federal courts jurisdiction over "[a]ny civil case of admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction" and over "[a]ny prize brought into the United
States and all proceedings for the condemnation of property taken as
15. Historically, the English admiralty courts had broad jurisdictional powers, but in the
1700s, those powers were narrowed to a handful of categories involving vessels, mariners' wages,
and injuries on the high seas, etc. In 1840, the English Admiralty Courts experienced something of a
revival, but were still severely limited at the time Article 1I1 was written. See 1 BENEDICT, supra
note 9, §§ 51-52.
16. De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776); 1 BENEDICT,
supra note 9, § 104, at 7-7 ("[Tlhe admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States is not
limited either by the restraining statutes or the judicial prohibitions of England ... but is to be inter-
preted by an original view of its essential nature and objects.....
17. 1 BENEDICT, supra note 9, §§ 51-52.
18. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1333
(2006)).
19. Id. ("[The district courts] shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of impost, navigation or
trade of the United States, where the seizures are made, on waters which are navigable from the sea
by vessels of ten or more tons burthen, within their respective districts as well as upon the high seas;
(a) saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is
competent to give it; and shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all seizures on land, or
other waters than as aforesaid, made, and of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the
laws of tile United States."); STEVEN L. SNELL, COURTS OF ADMIRALTY AND THE COMMON LAW:
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT IN CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 318 (2007).
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prize."2° Within the broad outline of Article III, the Supreme Court has had
wide latitude to shape the boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction.2
In the more than two centuries since the passage of the Judiciary Act of
1789, the reaches of admiralty jurisdiction have expanded considerably,
22both through statutes and judicial interpretation of those statutes. In the
early days of admiralty jurisdiction in the United States, the jurisdiction was
not understood to extend to navigable rivers or lakes, but to include only the
seas and so far inland as the tides could reach. In 1845 Congress enacted the
Great Lakes Act, a statute that extended admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
23to the Great Lakes and the navigable waters that connected them. In 1851,
in The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, the Supreme Court upheld the
Great Lakes Act against a constitutional challenge, thus confirming that ad-
miralty jurisdiction was not limited, with regard to locality, to those waters
24within the reach of the tides. In 1868, the Court went further, stating that
the 1789 Judiciary Act had never meant that admiralty jurisdiction only ex-
tended to tidewaters; this statement in effect rendered the 1845 Great Lakes
Act superfluous, as the Court was now suggesting that federal courts had
always had jurisdiction over the Great Lakes and navigable waters in the
United States.25
B. The History and Procedure of the Limitation Act
The Limitation Act permits the owner of a vessel to limit his liability re-
sulting from an accident to the value of the vessel, so long as he
demonstrates his lack of knowledge or participation in the event giving rise
to the claims.16 The Act passed on the last day of the 1851 legislative ses-sion, with no debate in the House and very little debate in the Senate.27
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1333.
21. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 4, at 20-21.
22. See infra Section II.B. The major changes in admiralty jurisdiction discussed here illus-
trate this trend; their relationship to the Limitation Act is discussed in Section I.B.
23. Great Lakes Act, ch. 20, 5 Stat. 726 (1845) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1873
(2006)); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852).
24. Propeller Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. 443.
25. The Eagle, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 15 (1869).
26. 46 U.S.C.S. § 30505 (LexisNexis 2007) ("[T]he liability of the owner of a vessel for any
claim, debt, or liability described in subsection (b) shall not exceed the value of the vessel and pend-
ing freight. If the vessel has more than one owner, the proportionate share of the liability of any one
owner shall not exceed that owner's proportionate interest in the vessel and pending freight. (b)
Claims subject to limitation. Unless otherwise excluded by law, claims, debts, and liabilities subject
to limitation under subsection (a) are those arising from any embezzlement, loss, or destruction of
any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board the vessel, any loss, damage, or injury
by collision, or any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred,
without the privity or knowledge of the owner.").
27. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 331-32 (1851); see Limitation Act, ch. 43, 9 Stat.
635 (1851) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-188 (2006)). For a discussion of the
Senate debate, see James J. Donovan, The Origins and Development of Limitation of Shipowners'
Liability, 53 TUL. L. REV. 999 (1979).
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While this dearth of debate means that it is not clear exactly why legislators
favored the act, judges and scholars have generally accepted that Congress's
purpose in passing the Limitation Act was to encourage shipping. To this
end, the Act protected the investment of a vessel owner by limiting his li-
ability to the value of the vessel, thus shielding him from large damage
awards for cargo lost at sea or for injuries suffered in accidents. 9 Because
the amount of liability an owner could face was limited to his investment in
the vessel, he would presumably not be deterred from future investments in
maritime shipping. Similarly, given the limitations on liability, other poten-
tial investors would presumably not fear placing their money in what would
otherwise be such a risky industry.3° As drafted, the Limitation Act made no
mention of any jurisdictional requirements (such as navigability) and of-
fered no guidance to courts as to how to proceed with protecting the
investments of vessel owners."
The Act was amended in 1884, as part of a larger bill concerning the
shipbuilding industry in the United States.32 The amendment clarified that if
a vessel belonged to several owners, each owner's liability would be limited
to his share in the vessel-the aggregate recovery against all of the owners
13
could equal no more than the vessel's value. While the original measures
had been intended to bolster the United States' merchant marine, it became
clear in the interim that without a strong shipbuilding industry, U.S. ship-
ping could not match England's. 34 While the changes to the Limitation Act
itself were minimal, its inclusion in the bill demonstrates that the purpose of
shipbuilding was layered on top of the original intent to encourage ship-
ping.35
Despite the fact that Congress had cared enough about limiting vessel-
owner liability to pass the Limitation Act in 1851, no one invoked the Act
(and no court had an opportunity to apply it) until 1871, twenty years after
28. See, e.g., Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 116 (1872) (stating that the
history of shipowner's limitation of liability is common knowledge and explaining the circum-
stances of its creation); 1 BENEDICT, supra note 9, § 109, at 7-22 ("[Tjhe Limitation of Liability Act
... [was] enacted for the purpose of encouraging investment in shipbuilding, by limiting the venture
of shipowners to the loss of the ship itself, or her freight then pending .... ").
29. Norwich, 80 U.S. at 119; CONG. GLOBE, 31 st Cong., 2d Sess. 331-32 (185 1).
30. Norwich, 80 U.S. at 116; CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 331-32 (1851). Some
courts and scholars have determined that the purpose of encouraging investment and shipping is no
longer a primary goal in a world with marine insurance and a proliferation of recreational vessels-
or is certainly far less important than it was in a world in which all international travel was depend-
ent upon oceangoing vessels. While the original purpose of the Act is certainly less pressing, the
Limitation Act has been amended several times-although not since 1936-and not only remains
intact, but applies to more types of vessels and claims than it initially did. This suggests that in fact,
at least through 1936, Congress believed that the Act's purpose was valid.
31. 9 Stat. at 635-36.
32. Act of June 26, 1884, ch. 121, § 18, 23 Stat. 53, 57-58 (codified as amended at 46
U.S.C. app. § 189 (2006)).
33. Id.
34. See 15 CONG. REC. 3427-31 (1884).
35. See id.
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its passage. In that year, the Supreme Court first encountered the Limitation
Act in Norwich Co. v. Wright, and observed that "[t]he circumstances which
. • ,,16 T
led to the passage of the act were notorious. In his opinion, Justice Joseph
P. Bradley briefly described the two steamship fires that had resulted in lost
lives and cargo and had ultimately led to the Act's passage.37 The earlier of
the two incidents was the burning of the steamship Lexington on January 13,
381840. While traveling from New York to Boston, the Lexington caught fire
and sank in the Long Island Sound. Out of the 143 passengers, only four
survived.3 9 The ship was also carrying valuable cargo, 40 and in 1848, after
years of litigation, the shipowners were found liable for the entire value of
the cargo even though the fault attributed to them resulted not from the
company's own actions, but from the conduct of a separate carrier, with
whom they had contracted to operate the ship.4' The Court found that the
shipowners were in business as a common carrier and, as such, were
considered insurers of all the goods they undertook to transport, whether or
not they contracted with another carrier (and included clauses meant to shift
any liability to the other carrier).42 While a provision in the shipping contract
stated that the vessel owner would not be liable for loss due to fire, the
Court found that clause unenforceable, the responsibility for insuring the
goods being assigned by law to the shipowner, and so found against the
vessel owners.43 The second incident leading to the passage of the Act
occurred in 1849, when the steamship Henry Clay, which had been loaded
with cargo and was still docked in New York, caught fire and burned to the
waterline."M Those whose cargo was lost sued the shipowners and achieved
the same result as in the Lexington litigation-liability for the shipowners
with no evidence of fault.45 Apparently deciding that such rulings would
prove harmful to the United States' maritime trade, Congress drafted and
passed the Limitation Act, with the clear goal of protecting vessel owners
who were not at fault for maritime accidents.46
36. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 108-09 (1872).
37. Id.
38. Id.; Joseph C. Sweeney, Limitation of Shipowner Liability: Its American Roots and Some
Problems Particular to Collision, 32 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 241,248 (2001).
39. Sweeney, supra note 38, at 249. For one of many artistic renderings of the tragedy, see
W.K. Hewitt, Awful Conflagration of the Steam Boat Lexington in Long Island Sound (Nathaniel
Currier lithographer, 1840), available at http://hdl.loc.gov/1oc.pnp/cph.3g03102.
40. Among the valuable cargo on the ship was a wooden crate-the contents of which had
been undeclared-which contained $18,000 worth of commercial paper. Donovan supra note 27, at
1011 (providing a detailed discussion of the Lexington case).
41. N.J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchs.' Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 381-85
(1848).
42. Id. at 381.
43. Id. at 382-85.
44. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 109 (1872).
45. Id.
46. Id.; Sweeney, supra note 38, at 252-62.
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Since its passage in 185 1, the Limitation of Liability Act has been a rec-
ognized basis of admiralty jurisdiction, even though its status as such has
come into question in recent years. 47 The Limitation Act is not a model of
clarity and courts faced with applying the Act when it was first invoked
twenty years after its passage were left with the task of figuring out not only
which courts should have jurisdiction over limitation proceedings, but also
what procedures should be in place for those vessel owners seeking to in-
voke the Act's protection. The Supreme Court addressed these issues in the
1871 case of Norwich Co. v. Wright, setting out specific procedures for limi-
tation actions and deciding that admiralty courts should hear them. 4 That
case involved a collision between a schooner, which sank immediately, and
a steamboat, which caught fire and then sank. 4 9 The owners of the schooner
sued the owners of the steamboat, who decided to invoke the protection of
the Limitation Act.50 The Supreme Court realized there was no procedure in
place for invoking the Act, and that the Act itself made no mention of how
vessel owners would be protected.5 Instead of waiting for the procedures to
be filled in through a series of legislative or lower-court decisions, the Su-
preme Court took the extraordinary step of designing comprehensive rules
to dictate how a vessel owner could seek limitation under the Act.
5 2
The rules the Supreme Court promulgated provided for a procedure by
which vessel owners could petition for limitation of liability in federal dis-
trict court, no matter where or in what court the initial claims against the
shipowners had been brought. The rules enable vessel owners to bring a
limitation proceeding in federal court-entirely separate from the underly-
ing claim-instead of merely raising the Limitation Act as a defense. This
procedure, designed by the Court in Norwich, is now codified in Supple-
mental Rule F of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; the rules for the most
part remain unchanged from the rules the Court articulated in Norwich."
Under the Federal Rules, within six months of receiving written notice of a
claim against him, a vessel owner must file a petition for limitation of liabil-
ity in a District Court.54 The vessel owner must then deposit a "limitation
fund" with the court that is equal to the value of the vessel, or else must
provide surety for that amount.5 The federal district court then halts any and
all proceedings in any state or federal court and issues notice that all claims
47. See infra Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (1911); Seven Resorts, Inc. v. Cantlen, 57
F.3d 771, 773 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Richardson undeniably holds that the Act is capable of conferring
independent jurisdiction beyond admiralty jurisdiction."); Section I.C.
48. Norwich, 80 U.S. at 123-25.
49. Id. at 106-07.
50. Id. at 107-08.
51. Id. at 123.
52. Id. at 125. The Court outlined the procedures now found in Supplemental Rule F of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. F.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. F.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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arising out of the incident must be brought in the court handling the limita-
56tion proceeding. Once all claims are brought in the District Court, in a
proceeding known as a "concursus," the judge then determines whether the
owner is subject to liability for the damages claimed. If so, the judge then
considers whether the owner is entitled to limit his liability-a determina-
tion that hinges on the owner's privity or knowledge. This procedure is
complex and, because it results in all claims being heard by a judge and not
a jury, allows for defense attorneys to wield the Limitation Act as a strategic57
weapon. Defense attorneys might wield the Act with special force in per-
sonal injury cases where a sympathetic jury might award a substantial
amount of damages to an injured plaintiff, but where a presumably more
objective judge will limit liability in conformance with the Act. 8
In addition to designing the procedures by which vessel owners would
bring limitation actions, the Norwich court noted that while the Limitation
Act "[did] not state what court [should] be resorted to," the appropriate
courts to hear limitation actions were the admiralty courts 59 -- or the federal
district courts sitting in admiralty. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
stated that "no court is better adapted than a court of admiralty to administer
precisely such relief' and pointed out that admiralty courts are experienced
with maritime liens and in rem proceedings, which resemble limitation ac-
tions in many ways.60 Additionally, the Court considered that Congress had
not specified that limitation petitions should go to the Circuit Courts and
.... 61
noted that the state courts clearly did not have jurisdiction. At the time ofthe Norwich decision, the District Courts' dockets were still filled with ad-
56. Id. at § 3. The goal of the procedures put in place for limitation actions is similar to that
of bankruptcy procedures: both involve the distribution of a fund that is inadequate to fulfill all
claims equitably among a group of claimants. See also Md. Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 415
(1953) ("The heart of [the Limitation] system is a concursus of all claims to ensure the prompt and
economical disposition of controversies in which there are often a multitude of claimants.").
57. Langes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 543 (1931) ("[I]f there is an ulterior purpose, and peti-
tioner's object in invoking the jurisdiction of this Court is to escape a jury trial and take the case
away from the common law jurisdiction, that purpose should receive no countenance here.
(quoting The Lotta, 150 F. 219, 223 (D. S.C. 1907)).
58. See Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1957).
59. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 123 (1872).
60. Id. In the world of maritime law, ships have their own legal personality. As such, when a
claim involving a vessel arises from either a tort or contract issue, a property interest is created for
the claimant against the vessel itself. This fiction is different than simply holding the owner liable
for damages. 2 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, CLAIMS AGAINST THE VESSEL § 21, at 2-1 to 2-2 (7th ed.,
rev. 2008). Courts sitting in admiralty have exclusive jurisdiction over maritime liens, and hear all
claims against the vessel in one proceeding, much like the concursus that occurs in a Limitation
Action. Id. § 22, at 2-12 & n.ll. The idea of a maritime lien is that "the vessel itself is liable for
torts and contracts, even though its owner may not be." Id. § 22, at 2-10. This means that regardless
of the owner's liability, the claimant is entitled to recover up to the value of the vessel, just as he is
under the Limitation Act.
61. Norwich, 80 U.S. at 123.
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miralty and maritime cases," so it likely did not seem strange for the Court
63to bestow the responsibility of hearing limitation actions upon them.
The Court did not address the seemingly more important threshold ques-
tion of whether the Limitation Act supported admiralty jurisdiction in and of
itself until fifteen years later, when the Court decided Ex parte Phenix In-
surance Co.64 Forty years after Phenix, the Court revisited the issue in
Richardson v. Harmon, deciding that the Limitation Act worked broadly to
grant federal admiralty jurisdiction even in the absence of other bases for
.... 65
such jurisdiction. After Richardson, it took almost seventy years before any
federal Court of Appeals ventured the suggestion that the Act should not
provide an independent basis for federal admiralty jurisdiction.
C. Establishing the Act as an Independent Basis for Jurisdiction:
The Meaning of Richardson v. Harmon
The Supreme Court's 1911 decision in Richardson v. Harmon seemed to
many courts and observers to establish the Limitation Act as an independent
basis for jurisdiction-a rule that held unquestioned sway for nearly seven
decades. In announcing the independent-jurisdiction holding of Richardson,
the Court did a complete about-face from its 1886 decision in Ex parte Phe-
nix Insurance Co.66 In Phenix, a steamboat passing near shore threw off
sparks that started a fire that consumed several buildings. 6' The steamboat's
owner sought to limit his liability against the claims of the owners of the
buildings, but the Court held that "where, as here, the tort is not a maritime
tort, there can be no jurisdiction in the admiralty to determine the issue of
liability or that of limitation of liability.' 68 In other words, the Court viewed
the damaging of shore-based facilities by a ship as "not a maritime tort."
The Court then concluded that the key test was whether the tort in question
was a maritime tort-whether the incident occurred on navigable waters and
had a nexus to maritime activity-and that the Limitation Act could not be
69invoked if admiralty jurisdiction were not otherwise established.
The Court in Richardson v. Harmon rejected the Phenix reasoning and
test, and instead held that the Limitation Act applied "whether the liability
62. See Warren J. Marwedel, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Recreational Craft Personal Injury
Issues, 68 TUL. L. REV. 423, 424 (1993).
63. In the days after the First Judiciary Act, the lower federal courts only heard admiralty
cases and diversity cases. Federal question jurisdiction had not yet come into being, and so admi-
ralty cases were a substantial portion of the caseload for district courts. See 15 Moore's Federal
Practice § 100 App. 01 (3d ed. 2009).
64. 118 U.S. 610 (1886); see infra Section I.C.
65. See infra Section I.C.
66. 118 U.S. 610 (1886).
67. Id. at611.
68. Id. at 625.
69. Id.
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be strictly maritime or from a tort non-maritime., 70 Richardson was similar
to Phenix in that it concerned a vessel on water causing damage to a struc-
ture on land.7 In Richardson, a steam barge left Lake Erie and, while
72traveling up the Maumee River, collided with the abutment of a bridge.
The bridge owners sued the owners of the steam barge in state court for
damages and, in response, the barge owners filed a petition for limitation in
federal district court.7 3 The Supreme Court distinguished Richardson from
Phenix, relying on an intervening 1884 amendment to the Limitation Act.
Granting that the Act in its original form "excluded both debts and liabilities
for non-maritime torts, 74 the Court found that the language of the 1884
amendment, which added the words "and liabilities," "add[ed] to the enu-
merated claims of the old law 'any and all debts and liabilities' not
theretofore included," and thus changed the meaning of the Limitation Act.75
In other words, in Richardson the Limitation Act provided an independent
grant of federal admiralty jurisdiction because the destruction of the abut-
ment was a "liability." The amendment, of course, had no application to
Phenix since the injuries in both cases preceded Congress's changing of the
16language .
The Richardson Court stated that construing the Limitation Act to ex-
tend to nonmaritime torts harmonized the statute with Congress's intent to
protect the investment interests of vessel owners.77 The case, however, is
vague about what qualifies as a " non-maritime tort.' 7 8 The clear example
comes from the facts of the case-a vessel on a river crashed into a land-
based structure causing considerable damage.7 9 It is unclear whether other
sorts of "non-maritime torts" were meant to be included and if so, to what
extent. However, looking again to the purpose of the act-the protection of
vessel owners' investments-the meaning that would harmonize the applica-
tion of the Limitation Act with its purpose is that it is a jurisdictional basis
in and of itself. If the purpose of the statute was to protect vessel owners and
encourage investment in ships, it should not matter whether the vessel is at
70. Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96, 106 (1911).
71. Id. at 99-100; Phenix, 118 U.S. at 611.
72. Richardson, 222 U.S. at 99-100.
73. Id. at 100.
74. Id. at 103.
75. Id. at 105. The 1884 amendment clarified that if more than one owner of a single vessel
sought to limit liability under the Act, each owner was responsible only in proportion to his owner-
ship interest. The actual meaning of the addition of the word "liabilities" in the 1884 amendment is
unclear. Some scholars theorize that the addition changed the meaning of the Limitation Act and
that the Court was merely looking for a way to distinguish Phenix. "[S]ince the Phenix case was not
decided until 1886, and since no earlier case had suggested that the 1851 Act did not apply to non-
maritime torts, it becomes most unlikely that Congress in 1884 was attempting to solve a non-
existent problem." GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 4, at 846.
76. Richardson, 222 U.S. at 104.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 99-100.
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sea, in a river, or tied to a dock when a loss occurs. The Richardson Court
expressed concern that the interpretation under Phenix would "utterly ignore
the fact that such a construction would leave an owner subject to a large
class of obligations arising from non-maritime torts."'
The Court's decision in Richardson may be viewed as a correction of the
interpretation adopted in Phenix, which focused the jurisdictional inquiry on
the geographic locus of the event giving rise to a tort claim. Instead, Rich-
ardson centered the inquiry on the existence of a limitation action as its own
proceeding, entirely separate from any state law tort claim." This rule was
confirmed by later cases, including the 1927 decision in Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co. v. Southern Pacific Co.,82 in which the Supreme Court reit-
erated that a limitation petition supports admiralty jurisdiction on its own,
apart from any consideration of the underlying tort claim." Chief Justice
Taft, writing for the Court in Hartford, stated that in the context of a pro-
ceeding for limitation of liability, "the court of admiralty has power to do
what is exceptional in a court of admiralty-to grant an injunction, and by
such injunction bring litigants, who do not have claims which are strictly
admiralty claims, into the admiralty court."84 It follows from this statement
that the nature of the claims underlying the limitation action do not deter-
mine whether the admiralty court has jurisdiction over the limitation
action-the petition for limitation itself determines the court's jurisdiction
over a limitation proceeding.
Beginning in the early- and mid-twentieth century, courts, (including the
Supreme Court) encountering questions of the Limitation Act's application
to nonmaritime torts, treated Richardson as controlling precedent." In 1917,
for example, the Second Circuit interpreted Richardson to mean that "pro-
ceedings for limitation of a shipowner's liability from all demands ... are
within the general maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction, and that such a
proceeding [is] an independent head of jurisdiction, without regard to
whether the claims limited against [are] such as might have been sued upon
in the admiralty or not."86 In No. 6, the Standard Gas Light Company of New
80. Id. at 104.
81. Id. In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 273 U.S. 207, 216
(1927), the Court noted that the Limitation Act was meant to provide "the administration of equity
in an admiralty court," implying that the equitable relief provided for in the Act is separate from any
damages claims arising from an underlying tort.
82. 273 U.S. 207.
83. In Hartford, the Court stated that "[tihe jurisdiction of the admiralty court attaches in
rem and in personam by reason of the custody of the res put by the petitioner into its hands." Id. at
217. Because the procedures for invoking the Limitation Act require the vessel owner to put the
vessel or surety for the value of the vessel into a district court's possession, that court may exercise
jurisdiction over the petition.
84. Id. at 218 (citing Providence & N.Y. S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883)).
85. E.g., The No. 6, 241 F. 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1917); In re Houseboat Starship II, No. 2:05-0086,
2005 WL 3440788, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. 2005); In re Bernstein, 81 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Mass. 1999);
In re Colonial Trust Co., 124 F. Supp. 73 (D. Conn. 1954); The Trim Too, 39 F. Supp. 271 (D. Mass.
1941); The Irving F. Ross, 8 F.2d 313 (D. Mass. 1923).
86. No. 6, 241 F. at 71.
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York City sued the owner of the steam dredge No. 6 for damage to the com-
pany's gas pipes, which were buried beneath the Harlem River. The dredge
had hit the pipes during a dredging operation, and the dredge owner, R.G.
Packard Company, sought limitation in district court. Standard Gas Light•• 87
claimed that because the underlying tort was nonmantime, admiralty
jurisdiction did not exist, and the limitation act could not be brought in the
federal district court. The Second Circuit stated that the petition was brought
"in strict conformity with Richardson v. Harmon" and went on to say
"[t]here is no doubt that [Richardson] is controlling authority here," noting
18the factual similarity between the cases. In 1941, the Supreme Court in
Just v. Chamberss again essentially reaffirmed Richardson, citing Richard-
son for the proposition that "limitation extends to tort claims even when the
tort is non-maritime." 90
D. The Relatively Recent Controversy over the Limitation Act
as a Basis of Admiralty Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court's holding in Richardson v. Harmon-that the Limi-
tation Act is an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction-enjoyed
respect for over seven decades. 9' More recent cases, however, have raised
the question of the Limitation Act's ability to form the basis for admiralty
jurisdiction anew-a controversy rekindled by a 1990 Supreme Court foot-
. 92
note that opened-or reopened, as the case may be-the question.
The recent controversy over the enduring power of Richardson began in
1989 when the Supreme Court heard an appeal from a Seventh Circuit deci-
sion, Sisson v. Ruby, that had held the Limitation Act was not an
independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction.93 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and in Sisson v. Ruby reversed on other grounds, finding jurisdic-
tion under the traditional two-part test for establishing admiralty jurisdiction
over tort claims-the incident occurred on navigable waters and had some
87. "The rule that tort liability, including liability for wrongful death, is ordinarily deter-
mined under the lex loci delicti is generally applied in admiralty .... " 2 AM. JUR. 2D Admiralty
§ 104 (2004). The traditional rule of lex loci delicti requires that the law of the jurisdiction where
the wrong occurred be applied. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (8th ed. 2004). At the time of
Richardson, the place of the wrong was determined to be the place where the injury occurred, not
where the negligence occurred. See Ala. Great S. R.R. v. Carroll, I I So. 803 (Ala. 1892).
88. No.6,241FEat7l.
89. 312 U.S. 383 (1941).
90. Id. at 386. Perhaps more importantly, the Court stated in passing that certain procedures
specific to maritime law kick in "[w]hen the jurisdiction of the court in admiralty has attached
through a petition for limitation." Id. This statement conveys the fact that the Court saw a petition
for limitation of liability as a mechanism that could support admiralty jurisdiction on its own.
91. 222 U.S. 96 (1911); see supra Section I.C.
92. Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 359 n.1 (1990).
93. In re Sisson, 867 F2d 341 (7th Cir. 1989).
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nexus to maritime activity.94 Before issuing its decision, however, the Court
asked the parties to brief the issue of whether it should reconsider Richardson.
In its opinion, the Court explicitly decided not to revisit Richardson-or at
least, not yet-and instead stated in a footnote that it was not reaching the
question of whether, if the traditional test were not met, the Limitation Act
would offer an independent basis for jurisdiction." The footnote and the
Court's questioning of Richardson were perceived by lower courts and some
legal scholars as a statement by the Court that the issue was an open ques-
tion rather than a previously decided question the Court had specifically
declined to revisit.96 Several Circuit Courts accepted what they perceived to
be the Supreme Court's invitation to experiment with Richardson and went
on to decide that the Limitation Act is no longer an independent basis for
jurisdiction.97 The Ninth Circuit, for example, summed up the sentiment of
many courts when it wrote that Richardson is "a historical anomaly that
cannot be fairly reconciled with modem admiralty jurisdiction."98
Despite the circuit decisions questioning Richardson, at least some Dis-
trict Courts have continued, even through the past few years, to regard
Richardson as good law. The District Court of Massachusetts, for example,
has held several times, most recently in 1999, that the Limitation Act is an
independent basis for jurisdiction and that Richardson, for better or worse,
is binding precedent. 99 The District Court of Connecticut and the District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee have held the same.'0o
Even in light of some recent moves to the contrary, Richardson still
seems to represent viable precedent. As recently as 2001, even in the wake
of several Courts of Appeal deciding that the Limitation Act is not, or is no
longer, an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
has made passing statements that assume jurisdiction to be grounded in the
Limitation Act." In Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., for example, Jus-
tice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous court, stated both that "the
94. 497 U.S. at 361-62. In order to establish admiralty jurisdiction, a court must first ask if
the incident occurred on navigable waters, and then whether it has a nexus to traditional maritime
activity. See also Jerome B. Grubar, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534
(1995).
95. Sisson, 497 U.S. at 359 n.1 ("We need not decide which party is correct, for even were
we to agree that the Limited Liability Act does not independently provide a basis for this action,
§ 1333(1) is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.").
96. David Wright Charter Serv. of N.C., Inc. v. Wright, 925 F.2d 783, 785 (4th Cir. 1991).
97. See sources cited supra note 7.
98. Seven Resorts, Inc. v. Cantlen, 57 F.3d 771, 773 (9th Cir. 1995).
99. In re Bernstein, 81 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Mass. 1999); The Trim Too, 39 F. Supp. 271 (D.
Mass. 1941); The Irving F. Ross, 8 F.2d 313 (D. Mass. 1923).
100. In re Colonial Trust Co., 124 F. Supp. 73 (D. Conn. 1954); In re Houseboat Starship II,
No. 2:05-0086, 2005 WL 3440788 (M.D. Tenn. 2005). A recent case in the District Court of Con-
necticut, which is situated in the Second Circuit, ruled the opposite way from In re Colonial Trust
and The No. 6, 241 F. 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1917). See Johnson v. Anderson, No. 3:06CV782, 2007 WL
735777 (D. Conn. 2007).
101. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 452 (2001) ("[T]he Limitation Act
granted the federal court jurisdiction over that action.").
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Limitation Act granted the federal court jurisdiction"''0 2 and that "lt]he dis-
trict courts have jurisdiction over actions arising under the Limitation
Act."' 3 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's footnote in Sisson, and the deci-
sions of the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts finding that
the Limitation Act no longer provides an independent basis for admiralty
jurisdiction, have raised as an important legal issue a question that was set-
tled law for over seventy years.
II. THE LIMITATION ACT AS AN INDEPENDENT
BASIS FOR ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
After the Sisson decision in 1989, several Courts of Appeal took the Su-
preme Court's footnote in Sisson regarding its decision not to revisit the
holding of Richardson to mean that the question of whether the Limitation
Act is an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction was open for recon-
sideration. Whether or not the footnote was meant to reopen the question,
since Sisson the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that
the Limitation Act does not form an independent basis for admiralty juris-
diction. Section II.A discusses the courts' proffered explanations for their
decisions and argues that the reasoning on which the circuits relied was fun-
damentally flawed. Section II.B makes the affirmative case for finding that
courts should read the Limitation Act to support admiralty jurisdiction.
A. Proffered Reasons not to Read the Limitation Act as an
Independent Basis for Admiralty Jurisdiction
In the decisions' °4 since 1989 in which the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have held that the Limitation Act does not create an inde-
pendent basis for admiralty jurisdiction, the courts have repeatedly and
consistently relied on flawed justifications that were originally advanced by
the Seventh Circuit in In re Sisson,'05 the case that the Supreme Court later
decided as Sisson v. Ruby. Having dismissed the importance and precedent
of Richardson, these courts then went on to apply the locality-nexus test for
torts to the events that underlay the respective petitions for limitations in
each action in order to determine whether those petitions came within admi-
ralty jurisdiction. The consensus among these circuits is, as the Seventh
Circuit noted in In re Sisson, that "a proceeding under the Limitation of Li-
ability Act will be cognizable in admiralty only when the underlying tort has
a relationship to traditional maritime activity."' 6
102. Id.
103. Id. at 454.
104. See sources cited supra note 7.
105. 867 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1989).
106. Id. at 350. In re Sisson was later reversed on other grounds-the Supreme Court found
admiralty jurisdiction based on the locality-nexus test for torts. Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990).
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Most of the arguments the four Circuit Courts cite stem from the Sev-
enth Circuit's decision in In re Sisson. In that case, the Seventh Circuit
considered the lawsuit that developed after a yacht caught fire due to a mal-
function in a washer-dryer unit on board.'07 The fire occurred while the
yacht was moored at a recreational dock on Lake Michigan. Judge Cudahy,
writing for the Seventh Circuit, noted that before the addition of the nexus
prong of the locality-nexus test, the tort claim itself would have been within
§ 1333 admiralty jurisdiction."" However, because the boat was moored at
the time, and thus not in navigation, the tort claim did not pass the locality-
nexus test." The Seventh Circuit also considered the yacht owner's claim
that the Limitation Act was a separate basis for admiralty jurisdiction and
concluded that it was not. The court based this decision on three arguments:
(1) that the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act (also known as the Ad-
miralty Extension Act (AEA)) eliminated the need for the Limitation Act to
operate as an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction, (2) that the local-
ity-nexus requirements for § 1331 jurisdiction over torts should apply to
petitions for limitation, and (3) that federal admiralty jurisdiction was not
necessary because the Limitation Act could be raised as a defense in state
court." O These three arguments, and the evolved forms of these arguments
that emerged in later decisions of the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,
are based on flawed reasoning and are ultimately incorrect."'
The first reason the Seventh Circuit presented for its holding in In re
Sisson was that the Admiralty Extension Act (AEA) of 1948' 12 had "elimi-
nate[d] the need and reason for the rule established by the case; for now
torts are 'maritime' even when the damage occurs on land."' The court
107. I re Sisson, 867 F.2d at 342.
108. Id.
109. The Supreme Court later reversed on this issue, holding that a moored boat still has a
nexus to traditional maritime activity-and as such, that the tort at issue in In re Sisson fell within
admiralty jurisdiction. Sisson, 497 U.S. 358.
110. In re Sisson, 867 F.2d at 349-50.
Ill. The Seventh Circuit and later the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits highlighted policy
concerns about limiting vessel owners' liability in scenarios involving injury or loss of life and small
recreational vessels worth a small amount of money. See sources cited supra note 7. While this kind
of situation is of particular concern, other considerations may make this objection less troubling. If
the owner was operating the vessel, he will be unable to demonstrate a lack of privity and knowl-
edge and will not be entitled to limitation. If someone operated the vessel negligently with the
owner's knowledge, a claim for negligent entrustment is possible. Additionally, while several of the
circuits express concern that the original purpose of the Limitation Act does not justify its applica-
tion to recreational vessels, amendments to the Act made in the 1930s appear to have expanded the
Act to include recreational vessels. For an in-depth discussion of policy arguments, see White, supra
note 4.
112. Pub. L. No. 80-695, 62 Stat. 496 (1948) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. § 740
(2006)) ("[T]he admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include
all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwith-
standing that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land.").
113. 867 F.2d at 349. The Fourth Circuit in Davis Wright Charter Service of North Carolina,
Inc. v. Wright held that Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (1911), is and always has been limited to
its facts. 925 F.3d 783, 785 (4th Cir. 1991). The Ninth Circuit in Seven Resorts, Inc. v. Cantlen reit-
erated that conclusion. 57 F.3d 771,772-73 (9th Cir. 1995).
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suggested that the "need and reason for the rule" announced in Richardson
should be confined to the factual situation at issue in Richardson-that
of a vessel on navigable waters causing damage to a land-based object.
However, this explanation ultimately proves flawed because while the fac-
tual scenario in Richardson is now admittedly covered by the AEA, the
Richardson Court's concern that a different construction of the Limitation
Act "would leave an owner subject to a large class of obligations arising
from non-maritime torts"' 4 actually extends to factual scenarios beyond the
one in Richardson.
The Limitation Act should be read to extend jurisdiction not only to
damages caused to land-based objects, but to other varieties of nonmaritime
torts. If the AEA eliminated the Limitation Act's ability to independently
support admiralty jurisdiction, then some vessel owners would be left sub-
ject to obligations arising from normaritime torts such as collisions on
nonnavigable waters and fires that take place while a vessel is undergoing
repairs-a result that seems incompatible with the Act's purposes. Under the
Seventh Circuit's construction, the vessel owner in In re Sisson, for exam-
ple, would have been left without the benefit of the Limitation Act (had the
Supreme Court not found that the underlying tort claim brought the case
within admiralty jurisdiction) because the Seventh Circuit found the incident
was not within the narrow scope of the AEA." 5
The second rationale for the holding in In re Sisson maintains that even
before the AEA, "jurisdiction under the Limitation of Liability Act-
although purportedly invoking a separate basis of jurisdiction--did not ig-
nore completely the requirements of admiralty jurisdiction under section
1333."116 The court noted that even though for purposes of the Limitation
Act the damages need not have occurred on navigable water, the vessel in-
volved must have some relationship to navigability."7 This reasoning led the
Seventh Circuit to apply the locality-nexus test for establishing § 1333 ad-
miralty jurisdiction over torts to the underlying tort claim in order to
determine whether the petition for limitation was within admiralty jurisdic-
tion." 8 However, admiralty jurisdiction in tort and admiralty jurisdiction
under the Limitation Act are separate types of admiralty jurisdiction, and as
such, the locality-nexus test should not be applied to the underlying tort
when a limitation petition is filed-rather, the petition should be treated as
114. Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96, 104 (1911).
115. Note that, as Judge Cudahy's opinion mentioned, the vessel owner in In re Sisson would
likely not have been entitled to limit his liability in the end because of the privity and knowledge
requirement. 867 F.2d at 342. A vessel owner who gets into admiralty court based on the Limitation
Act is not automatically entitled to limit liability-the right at issue is to have the claim for limita-
tion adjudicated in federal court. See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 440
(2001). This becomes important for those vessel owners being sued by multiple claimants in differ-
ent courts.
116. 867 F.2d at 349.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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its own proceeding that merits admiralty jurisdiction of its own accord." 9
Furthermore, vessels should not be thought to lose their maritime character
at those moments in which they are not in navigation. 20
The Seventh Circuit, and later the Fourth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits,
have applied the locality-nexus test for § 1333 admiralty jurisdiction over
torts in order to determine whether admiralty jurisdiction is available for
vessel owners petitioning to limit liability. Limitation petitions, however, are
entirely separate proceedings from the underlying tort claims, and the local-
ity-nexus test should not be applied. When the Supreme Court first applied
the Limitation Act in Norwich, the opinion explained that the Limitation Act
is an admiralty proceeding on its own, meant to protect vessel owners, and
resembles a maritime lien-a mechanism specific to maritime law which,
even now, merits admiralty jurisdiction on its own. 2 As such, it makes little
sense to apply the locality-nexus test designed for application to tort claims,
even though had the tort not occurred, no petition for limitation would have
been filed. 23 The Limitation Act in its original and current form allows an
owner to limit his liability not only when facing tort damages, but also
"those arising from any embezzlement, loss, or destruction of any property,
goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board the vessel ... ,,,24 As such,
the Limitation Act is not concerned solely with tort losses or confined by the
locality-nexus test of admiralty jurisdiction over torts. The Limitation Act
itself is part of the general maritime law, the outer boundaries of which go
much further than the locality-nexus tort test.
Even if a nexus requirement were imposed upon Limitation actions, a
vessel, whether in navigation or undergoing maintenance, necessarily has by
its nature a connection to traditional maritime activity. 25 Similarly, limita-
tion petitions have unique maritime character in themselves. When the
Supreme Court first applied the Limitation Act in Norwich, the Court ex-
plained that the Limitation Act was an admiralty proceeding on its own,
meant to protect vessel owners. It therefore resembled a maritime lien-a
mechanism specific to maritime law which, even now, merits admiralty ju-
risdiction on its own. 26 Additionally, in Sisson v. Ruby, the Supreme Court
119. See supra Marwedel, supra note 62, at 440 ("[A] federal court's admiralty jurisdiction in
tort and its admiralty jurisdiction under the [Limitation] Act are necessarily two separate species of
admiralty jurisdiction, the latter extending to any and all liabilities arising out of the conduct of the
vessel."); Section I.B.
120. See In re Colonial Trust Co., 124 F. Supp. 73 (D. Conn. 1954).
121. See FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. E; Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (1911); Norwich Co. v.
Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 125 (1872).
122. Norwich, 80 U.S. at 123.
123. Marwedel, supra note 62, at 440.
124. 46 U.S.C.S. § 30505 (LexisNexis 2007).
125. "For the purpose of the limitation of liability statute it should not be held that [vessels]
lose their maritime character ... because they are temporarily stored ashore as a regular part of their
maintenance." In re Colonial Trust, 124 E Supp. at 75.
126. Norwich, 80 U.S. at 123.
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stated that navigation was "an example, rather than ... the sole instance, of
conduct that is substantially related to traditional maritime activity."
'
'
27
In deciding whether to import the § 1333 locality-nexus test, the Seventh
Circuit also considered the policy reasons behind the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland and Foremost
Insurance Co. v. Richardson. 29 Before Executive Jet, the test for jurisdiction
under § 1333 was a pure locality test. "° In Executive Jet, the Supreme Court
considered a case in which a plane crashed into the Hudson Bay, perhaps
because of an encounter with a flock of birds.' 3' The Court held that because
the airplane had no relationship to traditional maritime activity, admiralty
jurisdiction did not exist in the case. Under the previous locality-only test,
the case would have come under admiralty jurisdiction. 132 The Court's goal
in adding the nexus prong was to ensure that the test would bring only those
cases with a relationship to maritime law into admiralty jurisdiction.
Later, in Sisson v. Ruby, the Supreme Court noted that "our holding in
Executive Jet was limited by its terms to cases involving aviation torts" but
that the reasoning in that case justified applying the locality-nexus test to
other types of claims as well.'33 In Foremost, the Court expanded the reach
of Executive Jet, holding that a collision between two pleasure boats on na-
vigable waters satisfied the nexus prong because of the effect it could have
on maritime commerce. 34 In In re Sisson, the Seventh Circuit decided that
the policies behind Executive Jet, which attempted to narrow admiralty ju-
risdiction to include only those cases with a relationship to maritime
activity, also suggested that Limitation Act cases should be constrained by
the new nexus requirement.1
31
The language of the Limitation Act makes no mention of a navigability
requirement and, as such, the test that has developed under § 1333 is ill-
fitted to determining jurisdiction under the Limitation Act. The Limitation
Act is only one of many statutes that support admiralty jurisdiction aside
from § 1333. Unlike the Limitation Act, other statutes that act as a basis for
admiralty jurisdiction specifically include a requirement of navigation. 36 For
example, the AEA includes as a condition of admiralty jurisdiction that
damage be done by a vessel on navigable water. 37 The Death on the High
127. Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 366 (1990).
128. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
129. 457 U.S. 668 (1982).
130. Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360.
131. Executive Jet, 409 U.S. 249.
132. Id.
133. Sisson, 497 U.S. at 361.
134. Foremost, 457 U.S. 668.
135. In re Sisson, 867 F.2d 341, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1989).
136. See, e.g., Admiralty Extension Act of 19A8, Pub. L. No. 80-695, 62 Stat. 496 (codified as
amended at 46 U.S.C. app. § 740 (2006)).
137. Id.
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Seas Act deals specifically with occurrences on the high seas-another sort
of locality concern. 38 By contrast, the Limitation Act refers to both "seago-
ing vessels" and to "vessels used on lakes or rivers or in inland
navigation,'"'39 a phrase that may be construed either as specifying locality or
type of vessel. Either way, the Limitation Act is silent on the issue of navi-
gability and, as such, importing the standard of navigation from § 1333
jurisprudence is unnecessary. The Limitation Act is clearly separate from
§ 1333 jurisdiction and the locality-nexus test for determining § 1333 juris-
diction over torts should not be applied to petitions for limitations, which
• 40
are entirely separate proceedings. The navigability requirement is gener-
ally phrased in terms of commerce-the idea being that waters are navigable
only if they support commerce between different states-but the Supreme
Court has previously held that admiralty jurisdiction is not constrained by
the Commerce Clause, but entirely separate from it.'
4
'
The Seventh Circuit's third rationale in In re Sisson, that "the claims of
other boat owners and of the owner of the marina could 'plainly' be heard in
state court without the intrusion of traditional maritime law concepts,"'4 2 is
also unpersuasive. The Seventh Circuit cited federalism concerns and noted
that state courts could apply state law to any claims that did not come under
admiralty jurisdiction without disrupting traditional maritime law but did
not specifically state whether the state courts could also consider Limitation
Act issues. 43 While state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction in
many areas of admiralty law, the possibility of leaving limitation actions to
the state courts has been more or less foreclosed by a line of cases beginning
with Norwich and culminating in Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc. in
2001.'" The Norwich court stated that it was "evident that the State courts
have not the requisite jurisdiction" to hear Limitation Act cases. 4 1 Indeed, it
138. Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (2006).
139. Limitation Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 30502 (LexisNexis 2007).
140. See Marwedel, supra note 62, at 440.
141. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 n.18 (1932) ("[Congress'] power [to revise the
maritime law] is distinct from the authority to regulate interstate or foreign commerce and is not
limited to cases arising in that commerce."); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 443 (1852).
142. In re Sisson, 867 F.2d 341, 350 (7th Cir. 1989).
143. See id. at 349-50. The Seventh Circuit seemed reluctant to allow the Limitation Act to
extend to vessel owners in such circumstances at all, not just to disallow jurisdiction based on the
Act. However, Congress enacted the Limitation Act and several amendments and the court must
apply them as written.
144. See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438 (2001); Lake Tankers Corp. v.
Henn, 345 U.S. 147 (1956); Langes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931); Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 104 (1872). These cases carve out limited circumstances in which concursus under the
Limitation Act is not necessary and state courts may hear claims-first, when the total of claims
pressed against a vessel owner is less than the amount in the Limitation fund, and second, when
there is only a single claimant. The cases necessarily imply that other cases must be heard in federal
court.
145. Norwich, 80 U.S. at 123.
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seems difficult to conceive of a way the benefit of the Limitation Act-
limiting liability to the value of the vessel-could be achieved without the
concursus proceeding, which ensures all claims against the vessel are heard
at once. 146 Without such a proceeding, several different courts could hear
several different claims against a vessel owner and award damages totaling
more than the vessel's value. A concursus proceeding is unlikely to occur in
a court without the power to stay any court proceedings that may have been
brought against the vessel owner.
Even if the logistics of handling Limitation Act issues in state court
could be orchestrated, moreover, in Lewis, Justice O'Connor, writing for the
Court, stated that the Limitation Act "grants vessel owners the right to seek
limited liability in federal court for claims of damage aboard their ves-
sels.', 47 A split has emerged among state and district courts regarding
whether a state court even has jurisdiction to hear issues relating to the Li-
mitation Act if a defendant attempts to raise its substantive protections as a
defense in a state court proceeding.'
s4
B. Why the Limitation Act Should Continue to Be Read
as a Basis for Admiralty Jurisdiction
In addition to the simple stare decisis value of continuing to apply Rich-
ardson, which held sway for seventy years, there are at least three reasons
why courts should continue to read the Limitation Act as an independent
basis for federal admiralty jurisdiction. First, reading the Limitation Act as
providing such jurisdiction would achieve the goal, effectively stated in
Richardson, of harmonizing jurisdiction with the purpose of the Limitation
Act itself. Second, failing to read the Limitation Act as an independent basis
for admiralty jurisdiction would lead to nonsensical distinctions regarding
which vessel owners may invoke the Act. For example, the owners of identi-
cal vessels which were involved in identical incidents, one on a navigable
lake and one on a nonnavigable lake, would not have the same remedy
available to them-the former could invoke the Limitation Act, while the
latter could not. Third, if the Limitation Act is not read as an independent
basis for admiralty jurisdiction, then part of the statute (the inclusion of
"lakes, rivers and navigable waters") is rendered superfluous. Reading the
Act as an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction, in contrast, gives
each word of this phrase meaning.
146. See Providence & N.Y. S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 595-96 (1883) ("[lIt is
obvious on the face of the thing, that proceedings for limited liability cannot be participated in by
two jurisdictions, without interference and conflict between them ... and cannot have any useful
effect if a different court may ... execute a separate judgment independent of, and perhaps contrary
to, that of the court to which the inquiry properly belongs.").
147. Lewis, 531 U.S. at 440 (emphasis added); see also Marwedel, supra note 62, at 441
("Limitation of liability is not available in state court, because the right exists only by federal statute
and is enforceable only in federal court.").
148. See, e.g., Howell v. Am. Cas. Co., 691 So. 2d 715 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Mapco Petro-
leum, Inc. v. Memphis Barge Line, Inc., 849 S.W.2d 312 (Tenn. 1993).
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The first justification for reading the Limitation Act as providing an in-
dependent basis for admiralty jurisdiction is that such a reading effectively
harmonizes jurisdiction with the original purpose of the Act. Scholars and
courts generally agree that the goal of the Limitation Act was the protection
of shipowners' investments; 49 as such, it seems irrelevant whether poten-
tially ruinous losses took place on land or at sea, or on navigable waters or
nonnavigable waters. The Limitation Act accomplished this goal by pro-
viding an equitable remedy to prevent owners from being crushed by
liability for damages that were beyond their control to prevent. 5 ' The Su-
preme Court, in the absence of specific instruction from Congress, decided
twenty years after the Limitation Act was enacted that limitation actions
should be heard by the admiralty courts, which were "best suited" to adjudi-
cate them.'52 The Court also noted that state courts did not have jurisdiction
to hear claims for limitation.'53
However, when some Federal Courts of Appeal attempt to limit the
scope of the Limitation Act to cases that have a separate basis for admiralty
jurisdiction 4 they deny the benefit of the Limitation Act to a class of vessel
owners who could otherwise claim it. Reading the Limitation Act to confer
admiralty jurisdiction on its own brings this group of vessel owners back
within the reach of the statute, and so matches the goal and rationale of the
Act."' Put another way, the Limitation Act was intended to protect all vessel
owners, not merely those owners who happened to own vessels that were on
navigable waters at the time an accident occurred. While the Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits no longer see much value in protecting
all owners of vessels, the proper remedy for their concerns is legislative.
Until and unless Congress agrees with their conclusions, or until and unless
the courts conclude that Congress did not intend to protect all vessel owners,
the courts should continue to provide the sorts of protection that Congress
apparently had in mind.
Admittedly, the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits' interpre-
tation of the Limitation Act as not providing an independent basis for
149. See supra Section I.B. While the importance of the original policy goals of the Limita-
tion Act have declined since 1851, the Limitation Act has been amended several times, either to
clarify or to expand the reach of the Act. As such, the original purpose may still inform the applica-
tion of the Act.
150. The purpose of the Limitation Act is expressed eloquently by Justice Bradley, who wrote
"The great object of the law was to encourage ship-building and to induce capitalists to invest mon-
ey in this branch of industry. Unless they can be induced to do so, the shipping interests of the
country must flag and decline." Norwich, 80 U.S. at 121.
151. Id. The goal of protecting investors from financial ruin raises less of an issue since the
marine insurance industry came into being.
152. Id.; see supra Section I.B.
153. Norwich, 80 U.S. at 123.
154. See cases cited supra note 7.
155. Marwedel, supra note 62, at 442 ("Conditioning application of the Act on the existence
of admiralty jurisdiction prevents the Act's utilization in nonmaritime cases and clearly interferes
with the goals of Congress in enacting the Act.").
November 2009]
Michigan Law Review
admiralty jurisdiction might, under at least one set of circumstances, con-
tinue to provide much the sort of protection Congress had in mind. If vessel
owners could take advantage of the substantive benefit of the Limitation
Act-limiting their liability-by raising the Limitation Act as a defense in a
state court action, for example, admiralty jurisdiction over limitation peti-
tions would not be as crucial. State courts in at least two states, Tennessee
and Louisiana, have decided that they do have jurisdiction to consider issues
related to the Limitation Act if no action is filed under 46 U.S.C. § 30511,
which codifies the requirement that a vessel owner bring a petition in a
federal district court within six months of written notice of a claim. 5 6 The
substantive portion of the Limitation Act is codified at 46 U.S.C. § 30505,
and the state courts in Tennessee and Lousiana determined that so long as a
defendant raised § 30505 as a defense, they would consider it."' These
cases, however, did not dispute that once a petition for limitation is filed in
federal district court, the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction over the
proceeding.'58 Indeed, this approach (federal, rather than state-defense, ju-
risdiction) may nonetheless be necessary, as a state court would not have the
power to stay parallel proceedings in another state's courts or in a federal
court with diversity jurisdiction and one of the benefits of the Limitation Act
is to prevent simultaneous incompatible judgments. In the absence of the
federal courts' authority under the Limitation Act to suspend other federal or
state actions, defendants could end up paying each of the claimants in any
action the full value of the vessel, which would defeat the purpose of the
Limitation Act. Alternatively, if one court chose to consider the Limitation
Act as a defense after another judgment had been rendered, the defendants
might have to pay the entire value of the vessel to one claimant, leaving
nothing for the others.
A second reason for reading the Limitation Act as providing an inde-
pendent basis for admiralty jurisdiction is that failing to read the Act in such
a way would lead to nonsensical distinctions regarding which vessel owners
may invoke the Act. In Richardson, the Court sought to harmonize the Limi-
tation Act with the Act's purpose of protecting vessel owners' investments.
Whatever some modem courts think of the Richardson decision, the
Richardson Court's reading of the Act is clearly supported by the statute's
apparent lack of concern with navigable waters or locality. The Limitation
Act originally did not apply to "the owner or owners of any canal boat,
barge, or lighter, or to any vessel of any description whatsoever, used in riv-
ers or inland navigation." '6° The focus of the Act when initially enacted in
156. See Howell v. Am. Cas. Co., 691 So. 2d 715 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Mapco Petroleum, Inc.
v. Memphis Barge Line, Inc., 849 S.W.2d 312 (Tenn. 1993).
157. Christopher S. Morin, Comment, The 1851 Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act: A
Recent State Court Trend to Exercise Jurisdiction Over Limitation Rights, 28 STETSON L. REv. 419,
435-47 (1998).
158. Id.
159. Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (1911).
160. Limitation Act, ch. 43, § 7, 9 Stat. 635, 636 (1851).
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1851 was on protecting vessel owners' investments in order to build a mer-
chant marine to rival England's. 6 When the statute was amended in 1884,
the focus had shifted away from international shipping and toward develop-
ing a shipbuilding industry in the United States. 16 Even later, in 1936, the
statute was amended to include the types of vessels used on "lakes, rivers, or
in inland navigation."'' 63 The statutory language, in its current form, is not
concerned with where a vessel owner's loss occurred or whether that loca-
tion brings the claim into admiralty; it is only concerned with protecting the
investments of owners in their vessels, whether they be ocean liners on the
high seas or barges on the Mississippi.' 64 Reading the Limitation Act to fo-
cus on navigability instead of vessel ownership would lead to a somewhat
random application of the Act-a yacht owner who takes his boat out on a
nonnavigable water such as the Lake of the Ozarks in Missouri would be
unable to invoke the Limitation Act in case of an accident,165 while a yacht
owner who takes his boat out on a navigable water such as Lake Michigan
would.
A third reason for reading the Limitation Act as providing an independ-
ent basis for admiralty jurisdiction is that failing to read the Act in such a
way would render the inclusion of "lakes, rivers and navigable waters" in
the statute superfluous. Assuming that Congress would not have drafted su-
perfluous language into an Act, such a reading would therefore seem to be
incomplete or erroneous. '66 In its current form, the Limitation Act applies
"to seagoing vessels and vessels used on lakes or rivers in inland naviga-
tion."' 67 If the Limitation Act only applies when the underlying claim
occurred on navigable waters, the words "lakes or rivers" are meaningless in
the context of the statute. 68 This language seems to clarify that the Limita-
tion Act's scope should not be limited by the locality of torts causing losses;
such a limitation would import a navigability requirement into the Limita-
tion Act. While it may seem counterintuitive that Congress would have the
power to give the federal courts jurisdiction over bodies of water contained
entirely within one state, it has long been held that admiralty jurisdiction,
161. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 331-32 (1851).
162. 15 CONG. REC. 3427-31 (1884).
163. Act of June 5, 1936, ch. 521, § 4, 49 Stat. 1479, 1481.
164. 46 U.S.C.S. § 30502 (LexisNexis 2007).
165. See Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. Ltd. v. Morts, 921 F.2d 775, 780 (8th Cir.
1990).
166. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 369 n.14 (1986) ("Moreover, if the phrase
is not to be read as a unit, but split, as the Solicitor General contends, into 'claims for any costs of
response or damages' and 'claims which may be compensated under this subchapter,' the latter
phrase becomes surplusage."); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGIS-
LATION 833 (3d ed. 2001) (citing Exxon Corp., 475 U.S. 355).
167. 46 U.S.C.S. § 30502 (LexisNexis 2007).
168. See supra note 5.
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with its nearly untraceable boundaries, is not limited by, and is constitution-
ally distinct from, the commerce power.169
CONCLUSION
The Limitation Act should remain an independent basis for admiralty
jurisdiction. This is the only way to give effect to the purpose of the stat-
ute-the protection of investment in shipping-in light of case law which
has foreclosed the option of adjudicating vessel owners' claims outside of
admiralty court. The Supreme Court has declined to reconsider Richard-
son, which established that the Limitation Act is an independent basis for
admiralty jurisdiction in all cases where vessel owners wish to invoke it, not
just when boats crash into an object on land.170 Given the Court's reluctance
to revisit Richardson, it is inappropriate (apart from any independent rea-
sons for finding that the Limitation Act provides an independent source of
federal admiralty jurisdiction) to read the Court's single footnote in Sisson
as issuing an open invitation for the Courts of Appeal to ignore Richardson
precedent. While there are arguably good public policy reasons for holding
that the Limitation Act does not independently support admiralty jurisdic-
tion, these reasons are not strong enough to justify a departure from
Richardson's long-standing precedent or to outweigh the arguments for con-
tinuing to allow admiralty jurisdiction based on the Limitation Act.
169. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 n.18 (1932); The Propeller Genesee Chief v.
Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852).
170. Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 359 n.1 (1990).
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